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The Legal Status of Amerasian
Children in Japan: A Study in the
Conflict of Nationality Laws
CHIN KIMI*
STEPHEN R. FOX**
This article examines the conflict between Japanese and United
States nationality laws, focusing on the nearly 4,000 Amerasian
children who may become stateless as a result of this conflict. The
effects of statelessness include legal, social, and economic hard-
ships. The authors argue that the problems facing these individu-
als can be eliminated statutorily by either Japan or the United
States or by a treaty between the two countries. Further, because
the problem of statelessness is not unique to Japan and the
United States, the authors urge multinational cooperation.
Traditionally, the right of a State to define citizenship has been
an indispensable element of sovereignty. As an aspect of their
territorial supremacy, States have the right not only to grant citi-
zenship but also to deny it.' Inevitably, different States have
adopted different systems of nationality laws, causing instances of
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** Member of the Illinois Bar; Law clerk to the Honorable Robert D. Morgan,
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1. P. WE IS, NAnONALTY AND STATELEssNEss IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 102, 166
(1956). Arguably, States are limited in their right to refuse to grant nationality by
a number of international agreements, most notably the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that-
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
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both statelessness and dual nationality. The problem has been
exacerbated in the twentieth century by the increase in interna-
tional travel and marriage, resulting in more children being born
out of their parents' native States.
One of the most striking examples of the hardships that the
conflict of nationality laws can cause is that of children born since
1952 in Japan of Japanese-American marriages. In 1974, Interna-
tional Social Service of Japan, Inc. (ISS) published a study of the
legal and social problems of almost 4,000 of these Amerasian chil-
dren.2 Because the fathers of these children, mostly American
servicemen, are not Japanese, the children are not Japanese citi-
zens. Although they are United States citizens from birth, these
Amerasian children will lose their citizenship and become state-
less unless they reside in the United States continuously for two
years between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight.3 Many of
these children live in fatherless homes under marginal economic
circumstances, and because they are not Japanese citizens, they
are ineligible for many social welfare benefits, including health in-
surance. A major illness striking one of these children could be
compounded into a financial crisis for its family. Further, if these
children allow their United States citizenship to lapse and they
become stateless, they will remain in Japan at the sufferance of
the Japanese government, and no other government could protect
them from discrimination or expulsion.
The legal and social problems confronting these Amerasian
children reflect many of the problems that typically result from
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied
the right to change his nationality.
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15, G.A. Res.
217A(I), U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948).
2. INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICE OF JAPAN, INC., RESEARCH ON CHILDREN OF
U.S. NATIONALITY IN JAPAN: FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTING THEM FROM LOSS OF
NATIONALITY (1974) [hereinafter cited as ISS STUDY] (on file with the San Diego
Law Review). ISS found 3,913 of these children. Id. at 7. Approximately 92% of
the children in the ISS study were born in Japan, and eight percent were born in
third countries. The legal status of those children born in third countries, how-
ever, is substantially the same as that of the Amerasian children born in Japan.
In addition to the children of the ISS study, all of whom are legitimate, addi-
tional thousands of illegitimate Amerasian children, the products of liaisons be-
tween American servicemen or tourists and Japanese women, live in Japan.
Because the fathers of these illegitimates cannot be found or are unknown, the
children cannot claim United States citizenship. Japanese law, however, grants
Japanese citizenship to children of unknown fathers if their mothers are Japanese.
Japanese Nationality Law, Law No. 147 of May 4, 1950, art. 2, § 3 [hereinafter cited
as Nationality Law], translated in A. MUTHARIKA, THE REGULATION OF STATELESS-
NESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAw pt. v (1977). Ironically, the legal
status of illegitimate Amerasian children in Japan is thus far less precarious than
that of legitimate ones.
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976).
[voL. 16: 35, 19781 Conflict of Nationality Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
conflicts between nationality laws, and demand immediate atten-
tion. This article will review briefly the two major conflicting prin-
ciples of nationality law and their rationales and will discuss the
consequences of conflicts between the two principles. It then will
examine the nationality laws of Japan and the United States with
particular reference to the provisions that affect the children of
the ISS study. Much of this discussion will center on the social
and legal status of Amerasian children in Japan and on current
judicial interpretation of the relevant portions of United States
nationality law. The article will conclude by suggesting several
unilateral and bilateral means of resolving the nationality
problems of these children and multilateral means of reducing
the statelessness that results from the conflict of nationality laws.
THE INERNATIONAL LAW OF NATIONALrTY
Historically, nationality has served as the link between individ-
uals and States, which are the only recognized actors in interna-
tional law. States have the right to confer or withhold citizenship
as they see fit.4 As a result, an individual cannot demand protec-
tion abroad from his State. Whether to assert such protection is
exclusively a decision of the State.5
Because municipal law governs the acquisition of nationality,
international law demands no uniformity among nationality laws.
In practice, however, two principles govern such laws: jus soli
and jus sanguinis.6 States following jus sanguinis grant citizen-
ship to all children whose parents are citizens of the State, wher-
ever the child is born. Nations adopting the principle of jus
sanguinis characteristically grant the child of a mixed marriage
the nationality of its father and an illegitimate child that of its
mother.7 Jus soli, on the other hand, grants nationality to all per-
sons born in the territory of a State regardless of the nationality
of their parents. Jus soli thus creates no distinctions of citizen-
4. 1 L. OPPENHEnm, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291, at 640 (8th ed. Lauterpacht
1955); P. WEIS, supra note 1, at 166.
5. 1 L OPPENHEIM, .supra note 4, § 291, at 640.
6. P. WEIs, supra note 1, at 97. The nationality laws of most States incorpo-
rate elements of both principles, but one or the other usually predominates. Id.
The extensive use of these two principles as the framework for municipal nation-
ality laws does not of itself create a norm of international law because congruence
of municipal law is not sufficient to create a norm; consensus among States that a
norm exists is equally necessary. See id. at 98.
7. Id. at 97. Japan, and most civil-law States, follow jus sanguinis.
ship between the legitimate and the illegitimate, or between chil-
dren of aliens and children of citizens of the State of birth. It
distinguishes, rather, between those born within the territory of a
State and those born abroad, and denies nationality to children
born abroad even if both parents are citizens.8
Jus sanguinis and jus soli will not create nationality problems
for the vast majority of people, but conflicts between the two prin-
ciples may create nationality problems for those children not
born in their parents' native State. For example, a child born in a
State following jus soli, but whose parents are nationals of a
State that follows jus sanguinis, acquires two nationalities at
birth: that of his parents and that of the State in which he is born.
Conversely, a child born in a State following jus sanguinis, whose
parents are citizens of a State following jus soli, acquires no na-
tionality at birth: The State in which he is born cannot grant the
child the nationality of its parents without infringing upon the
parents' State's sovereignty, and the parents' home State does not
grant nationality except as a consequence of birth within the
State.9 Further, should the child remain in a jus sanguinis State,
its children may be stateless as a consequence of its stateless-
ness.' 0 The children of the ISS study illustrate a third type of
conflict between the two principles. Their Japanese mothers are
nationals of a State that follows primarily jus sanguinis; their
American fathers are nationals of a State that follows jus soli. Jus
sanguinis generally holds that children of mixed marriages ac-
quire their father's nationality, while jus soli denies nationality to
8. Id. Common-law States are the principal adherents of ju3 soli. One com-
mentator suggests that this system of defining nationality is the product of the
feudal system of medieval England, in which the individual was tied to the soil. A.
MuTHASIcA, supra note 2, at 4. Although the dominant principle of United States
nationality law is j=s soli, the provision that will render the Amerasian children in
Japan stateless is a variant of jus sanguinis. See notes 51-92 and accompanying
text infra.
9. These examples are of necessity somewhat simplistic but serve to illus.
trate the results of the simultaneous existence of two essentially inconsistent
principles. In many instances, States statutorily mitigate the consequences of the
conflicts between the two principles for certain groups, such as diplomats, and few
States adhere to "pure" jus soli or jus sanguinis principles.
10. The legitimate children of a stateless man living in a juS sanguinis State
will be stateless regardless of the citizenship of his wife because citizenship of
children of mixed marriages descends patrilineally in jus sanguinis States. Of
course, if his wife is a citizen of a third country, the jus- sanguinis State of birth
cannot grant the child its mother's nationality. The legitimate children of a state-
less woman will be stateless unless they are born in a jus soli State or unless the
woman's husband is a national of a jus sanguinis State. Again, the example is
valid only for purposes of illustration because most nationality laws deviate from
"pure" principles to accommodate such situations as these. For further discussion
of statelessness from birth, see 1 L. OPPErnEim, supra note 4, § 311.
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all children born abroad regardless of their parents' citizenship."
Although conflict of nationality laws creating statelessness from
birth is the most common cause of individual statelessness,12
some persons lose their nationality by other means. The legisla-
tures of some States terminate the nationality of citizens who re-
main abroad for specified periods of time, inferring an intent to
expatriate from the individual's prolonged absence.' 3 In other in-
stances, States may terminate nationality for such other reasons
as unlawful departure from the State initially.14 Expiration of na-
tionality is the prospect facing the Amerasian children of the ISS
study unless they meet the United States' two-year residency re-
quirement. Only the conflict of nationality laws between Japan
and the United States, however, makes the expiration clause a
matter of legal and social concern.
The prospective statelessness of 4,000 children of mixed Japa-
nese-American marriages is not the most extensive or the most
shocking example of modern statelessness, 5 but it illustrates the
11. The United States deviates from "pure" principles of jus soli to the extent
of granting citizenship to children born abroad of one citizen and one alien parent.
This citizenship is defeasible, however, and is the source of the potential stateless-
ness of Amerasian children.
12. A. MuTmumA, supra note 2, at 3. A stateless person is one "Who is not
considered a national by any State under the operation of its laws." Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, done Sept. 28, 1954, art. 1, 360 U.N.T.S.
117. The other causes of individual statelessness, voluntary renunciation and dep-
rivation as a consequence of performing certain acts (such as joining the armed
forces of a foreign State or voting in a foreign election), are encountered rarely be-
cause few people renounce their nationality without acquiring another and be-
cause municipal law may restrict severely the use of the sanction of
denationalization. See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); A. MUTHAMIKA,
supra at 2-13; 1 L. OPPENHEn, supra note 4, § 302.
13. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 4, § 302, at 658.
14. P. WEIs, supra note 1, at 120.
15. Mass statelessness has been a major political problem of the twentieth
century. Vagueness in the terms of some of the treaties ending World War I, and
the parties' unwillingness to adjust their nationality laws to accommodate ethnic
minorities living in areas that changed sovereignty, created extensive stateless-
ness in central Europe. Between the World Wars, the Soviet Union, Italy, and
Germany all denationalized large groups of citizens for political reasons. A.
MUTHARIKm, supra note 2, at 5-13.
The Japanese-American children of the ISS study are but one example of state-
lessness resulting from the conflict of nationality laws. The problem of Thai-
American children is as extensive. Approximately 4,000 children born of Thai
mothers and American serviceman fathers during the Vietnam war are in danger
of becoming stateless as the result of a Thai enactment that denies nationality to
'those persons born in the Kingdom of Thailand by alien fathers or by alien
mothers, but without apparent legal fathers and at that time fathers or mothers
problems inherent in an international order that accepts the two
conflicting principles of jus sanguinis and jus soli. So long as
States determine their own criteria for nationality, statelessness
as a result of the conflict of nationality laws is inevitable. For the
individual, statelessness is undesirable because he may be ineligi-
ble for many government services where he lives and because no
State is obliged to protect him. For the international community,
statelessness is undesirable because the existence of stateless
persons can be a source of international friction.16 A close exami-
nation of the logic and operation of the nationality laws of Japan
and the United States and of the consequences of maintaining the
present dual system of nationality laws will show the hardships
that statelessness can create.
JAPANESE LAW OF NATIONALiTrY: Jus SANGUINIS
Historically, jus sanguinis has been the dominant principle of
Japanese nationality law. The first statute regulating nationality,
passed in 1873, provided that an alien woman who married a Japa-
nese man acquired Japanese nationality but that a Japanese wo-
man who married an alien man acquired his nationality. This
statute also followed customary Japanese law that the child of
... persons who were allowed to reside in the Kingdom of Thailand temporarily."
Simon, Thais to Make GIs' Babies Stateless, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1977, § A, at 25,
col 3. The law may have been intended initially to apply only to the children of
Vietnamese refugees, whom the Thai government considered potential security
risks, but it has been applied to Thai-American children. See id. Whether the law
is being applied to the children now is uncertain, compare id., with N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1977, at 8, col 1 (reporting that government officials had changed their in-
terpretation of the law so as to exclude Thai-American children from its opera.
tion), but if the Thai government applies the law to the children, they will be
denied identity cards, admission to Thai universities, entry into the armed forces
and civil service, and the right to own land. Simon, supra.
Similarly, officials of the Pearl S. Buck Foundation, which cares for mixed-blood
children in several Asian nations, assert that Korean officials have denied nation-
ality to Korean-American children. Id.
16. P. Wss, supra note 1, at 166. One authority argues that "it is both illogical
and offensive to human dignity that International Law should permit a condition
of statelessness," "so long as nationality is the link between the individual and the
protection of rights accruing to him by virtue of International Law." 1 L. OPPEN-
HErm, supra note 4, § 313a, at 673. Implicit in this argument is a rejection of two
coexisting principles of nationality law; indeed, Lauterpacht advocates a uniform
principle of nationality. Such a uniform principle, however, would cause severe
domestic political problems, whatever principle were adopted. For example, one
can scarcely conceive of the Palestinians accepting an Egyptian adoption of jus
soli that would seriously weaken their claim to a rightful home in Israel, or of the
United States abandoning the jus soli principle enshrined in the fourteenth
amendment. The right to define the prerequisites for citizenship in the State lies
at the core of the concept of sovereignty. Nonetheless, Lauterpacht proposes ex-
tensive reforms in the system of determining nationality, discussed at notes 101-09
and accompanying text infra. Id. § 313a, at 674.
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Japanese parents was Japanese, wherever it was born. Although
the statute apparently did not mention children of alien parents
born in Japan, the customary law did not grant such children Jap-
anese nationality. 7 The more comprehensive nationality statute,
enacted in 1899,18 granted a child Japanese nationality if its father
was Japanese at the time of its birth. If the child's father died
before it was born and was Japanese at the time of his death, the
child also became Japanese.19 A child whose father could not be
ascertained or who had no nationality acquired Japanese nation-
ality if its mother was Japanese.20 Foundlings born in Japan and
children born in Japan of stateless couples also acquired Japa-
nese nationality.21 These latter two provisions, plus detailed
(though restrictive) provisions for naturalization, were the major
exceptions to a system otherwise embodying jus sanguinis.
The law of 1899 remained in effect until after World War 11. The
Constitution of 1947 granted the Diet the power to define the con-
ditions of Japanese nationality,22 which it did in 1950.23 The new
Nationality Law retained all the conditions of acquiring Japanese
nationality at birth but created no new ones.24
Thus, Japanese law does not grant Japanese citizenship to the
legitimate children of Japanese mothers and American fathers be-
cause the children do not come within any of the exceptions to
jus sanguinis in the Japanese Nationality Law. Though these
Amerasian children may be born, live their entire lives, and die in
Japan, they will remain aliens.
Alienage always deprives an individual of some rights and op-
portunities that citizens enjoy. The deprivations of the most im-
mediate importance to the Amerasian children of the ISS study
are economic. 25 ISS found that only about half of the children
17. See R. FLoURNoY & M.L HUDSON, A CoL. CTiON OF NATIONALITY LAws 381
editor's note (1929).
18. Law No. 66 of 1899, translated in IL FLOURNOY & M. HUDSON, id. at 382-88.
19. Id. art. 1.
20. Id. art. 3.
21. Id. art 4.
22. KENPO (Constitution) art. X (Japan), translated in 7 A. BLAUsTEiN & G.
FLANz, CONSTrrUIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORMD (1973).
23. Nationality Law, note 2 supra.
24. Article 2 of the Nationality Law, id., contains only the four means of ac-
quiring Japanese nationality at birth discussed at text accompanying notes 18-21
supra.
25. ISS reported that only one-fourth of the Amerasian children it interviewed
recalled having experienced any prejudice as a result of their ethnicity. ISS
lived with both parents in 1973; forty-three percent lived in father-
less households, and half of those depended solely on the
mother's income.26 ISS found that most of these households were
economically unstable and that the instability was exacerbated by
the children's lack of Japanese nationality. Children of foreign
nationality are ineligible for many Japanese social welfare pro-
grams, most notably health insurance. Almost half of the children
that ISS interviewed reported that they had no health insur-
ance.27 Many of the mothers in fatherless households worked at
low-paying jobs,28 so a major accident or illness could become a
financial, as well as a medical, catastrophe that might be averted
if the children were eligible for government health insurance.29
Educational patterns among the children further illustrate the
complexities of the situation. Two-thirds of the children in the
ISS study had Japanese-language compulsory education, one-
third English. Included among the Japanese-educated were virtu-
ally all of the children from fatherless households, who were
raised as Japanese.30 Because these children have never been to
their fathers' native country and speak little, if any, English, the
cultural barriers to meeting the residency requirement of United
States law may be as great as the financial burden of two years'
residence in the United States, required for retention of their
United States citizenship. For those children who had English-
language schooling, the burden will be considerably lighter. Be-
cause many of them come from homes in which the father re-
STUy, supra note 2, at 24. The most pressing problems facing the children are
economic and legal.
26. Id. at 2, 18. Eighty-six percent of the fatherless households had lost the
father by divorce, separation, or disappearance, most probably the result of cross-
cultural tension in the family. Id. at 18-20. Four-fifths of the mothers heading fa-
therless households were employed, contributing further to family instability be-
cause the conflicting demands on their time required them to be away from home,
unable to supervise young children much of the time.
27. Id. at 22. Eligibility for national health insurance depends on the policy of
the local government, and since 1973, resident foreign nationals have been eligible
for such insurance in the larger prefectures where many of the children live. Thus
27% of the children reported being covered by national health insurance in their
prefectures, and 14% reported being covered from other Japanese government
sources. Id. at 21-22.
28. Among the jobs that the mothers reported holding were bar hostess, clerk,
cleaning woman, waitress, and factory worker. Id. at 18.
29. Among other programs for which the children were ineligible were assis-
tance to preschool children and physically and mentally handicapped children,
medical examinations, and counseling. Id. at 19.
The children's lack of Japanese nationality is in many cases only a complicating
factor in the instability caused by their fathers' absence. If the children had Japa-
nese nationality, the underlying instability would remain but would be amelio-
rated by the financial assistance the government provided.
30. Id. at 22.
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mains, the language and cultural barriers, and presumably the
financial burden, will be less formidable.
As these children grow older3 ' their legal status as aliens under
Japanese law will create further problems if they continue to re-
side in Japan. Many of the problems will result from operation of
the Horei, the Japanese confict-of-laws statute,32 which requires
that the lex patriae, the law of a person's nationality, be used to
determine the person's legal capacity.33 Thus, until they lose
their United States nationality, the capacity of these children to
marry, for example, will be governed by United States rather than
by Japanese law.34 Most of these children have never resided in
the United States35 and a fortiori have no domicile in a state in
the United States from which to derive capacity to marry. Japa-
nese courts applying the Horei literally thus would deny these
children the right to marry so long as they remain United States
citizens.
The Horei, however, provides that "the law of a foreign country
shall not govern if its provisions are contrary to public policy and
good morals.' '36 Japanese courts have used this provision to avoid
harsh consequences in a series of decisions granting divorces to
Japanese wives of Filipino husbands.37 The Horei requires di-
vorce to be governed by the law of the husband's nationality at
31. At the time of the ISS study in 1973, the children ranged in age from 21 to
less than one year old. Id. at 9. The oldest of the children are now 26, and if they
have not begun to reside in the United States, they have forfeited their United
States citizenship and already are stateless. For the oldest children, then, the le-
gal consequences of statelessness are not a matter of conjecture but are reality.
32. Horei (Law Concerning the Application of Laws), Law No. 10 of 1898 (as
amended) [hereinafter cited as Horei], translated in Ikehara, Nationality in the
Private International Law of Japan, 7 JAP. ANN. INT'L L 8, 20 (1963).
33. Id. art. 3, § 1. However, an alien who performs an act in Japan for which
he lacks capacity under his national law, but who would have capacity to perform
the act under Japanese law, is deemed to have capacity. Id. art 3, § 2.
34. Id. art. 13, § 1 provides that the requirements for marriage are governed by
the parties' nationality but that the formal requirements are governed by the place
of celebration. Because the states of the Union determine their own marriage re-
quirements, no United States law would govern the capacity of those children who
do not have a United States domicile in which to marry. Further, because the con-
flict-of-laws principles of the state of domicile would govern, the lack of domicile
would prevent a Japanese court from applying its own law through renvoi
35. Sixty-nine percent of those interviewed had never lived in the United
States. ISS STuDY, supra note 2, at 23.
36. Horei, supra note 32, art. 30.
37. These decisions are discussed in Ikehara, Nationality in the Private Inter-
national Law of Japan, 7 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 8, 10 (1963).
the time the grounds arose provided that the facts are also
grounds for divorce under Japanese law.38 Filipino law, however,
does not allow divorce, so the Japanese courts have had to choose
between following the principle of lex patriae to deny the divorce
and invoking the public policy exception of the Horei to apply the
Japanese lexfori. In cases in which the last matrimonial domi-
cile was Japan and one of the spouses continued to reside in Ja-
pan, the courts have held that following Filipino law would be
contrary to the Japanese policy of granting divorce and have fol-
lowed Japanese law.39 The lack of domicile in the United States
does not come within the literal provisions of the public policy ex-
ception to the Horei because it is not a provision of United States
law that violates public policy and good morals; rather, the lack of
an applicable provision denies Amerasians the right to marry.
Nonetheless, the similarity of the hardship to that suffered by
Japanese wives of Filipino husbands makes it likely that Japa-
nese courts will invoke the exception and allow Amerasians to
marry.4o
This reasoning should govern courts that must decide questions
involving the capacity of children of mixed marriages. 41 The
Horei requires lex patriae to determine the effect of a marriage, 42
the legitimacy of children,43 property rights of spouses," legal re-
lations between parents and children, 45 intestate succession,46
and the creation and effect of wills.4 7 If Japanese courts were to
apply United States law, the lack of a United States domicile nec-
essarily would deny Amerasians any legal capacity so long as
they retained their United States nationality.
38. Horei, supra note 32, art. 16.
39. Had the courts followed Filipino law, several plaintiffs whose husbands
had deserted them would have been unable to remarry.
40. The hardship suffered by Amerasians would be harsher, if anything, than
that suffered by the Japanese-Filipino wives. Had the courts applied the Horei
strictly, they would have denied the wives the opportunity to begin second fami-
lies. If they apply it to Amerasians, they will deny them the opportunity to begin
their first.
41. If any courts have decided such questions, their decisions are not reported
in the literature on the subject that appears in English.
42. Horei, supra note 32, art. 14. The lex patriae to be applied is that of the
husband, so this provision will not directly affect girls of mixed parentage.
43. Id. art. 17. Again, the lex patriae is patrilineal.
44. Id. art. 15. The lex patriae to be applied is that of the husband at the time
of the marriage.
45. Id. art. 20. The father's nationality, again, determines the applicable law.
46. Id. art. 25.
47. Id. art. 26, § 1, provides that the substantive law of the testator's national-
ity governs the effect of his will, but § 3 allows the jurisdiction where the testator
makes or revokes a will to impose its formal requirements.
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Although the Japanese Nationality Law raises many problems
for children of mixed parentage by following jus sanguinis princi-
ples; it deviates from '"pure" jus sanguinis principles in one im-
portant particular. It grants Japanese nationality from birth to
children of Japanese mothers and stateless fathers.48 This devia-
tion may create nationality problems for the offspring of Amer-
asian men, best illustrated by the following hypothetical situation:
The son of an American father and a Japanese mother marries a
Japanese woman when he is twenty-two years old. The couple
has its first child two years later, and a second five years after the
first, when the Amerasian man is twenty-nine. When the first
child is born, the man is still a United States citizen, so the child
cannot acquire Japanese nationality.49 When the second child is
born, however, the father has become stateless, and his child ac-
quires Japanese nationality at birth. By deviating from "pure"
principles of jus sanguinis, the Japanese Nationality Law may
avoid perpetuating statelessness in many instances.
Ironically, many of the nationality problems that arise under
the Horei will disappear for those Amerasians who allow their
United States nationality to lapse, because the Horei provides
that for persons who have no nationality, the law of domicile is
considered the law of nationality.50 Those Amerasian children
who allow their United States nationality to lapse will moot all
questions of international conflict of laws and determinations of
whether the lack of an applicable United States law violates Japa-
nese public policy. Becoming stateless, however, will have other,
more serious, consequences. A consideration of applicable United
States nationality law will help to emphasize the seriousness of
these consequences.
UNITED STATES NATIONALITY LAw
All United States nationality law derives from two provisions of
the Constitution: the fourteenth amendment's provision that
48. Nationality Law, supra note 2, art. 2, § 3.
49. The child will not derive United States citizenship through its father, how-
ever. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7) (1976) requires a child born abroad of an alien and a
United States citizen to live in the United States for 10 years, including at least
five after his fourteenth birthday, before he can transmit United States citizenship
to his children. Our hypothetical father, who cannot satisfy the residency require-
ment to retain his own citizenship, cannot transmit citizenship to his offspring..
They will be born stateless.
50. Horei, supra note 32, art 27, § 2.
"[all persons born or naturalized in the United States and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States"51
and Congress's power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturali-
zation."52 The fourteenth amendment thus constitutionalizes the
principle of jus soli although Congress has added significant ele-
ments of jus sanguinis to the statutory scheme of citizenship
since its inception. 53 Until the Citizenship and Naturalization Act
of 193454 granted American women the right to transmit United
States nationality to their children born abroad,55 however, only
American fathers could transmit United States citizenship to chil-
dren born abroad.56
The 1934 Act also introduced an important new concept to
United States nationality law: citizenship subject to a condition
subsequent. Although the Act granted citizenship from birth to
children born abroad of one United States citizen and one alien,
Congress was concerned that such children might be subject to
divided loyalties.57 The Act therefore required them to live in the
United States for at least five years immediately before their
eighteenth birthday and to take an oath of allegiance within six
months of their twenty-first birthday to retain their citizenship.58
Subsequent amendments have eliminated the oath of allegiance
and have liberalized the residency requirements so that the stat-
ute, now section 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
requires residence in the United States for two years between the
ages of fourteen and twenty-eight to retain United States citizen-
ship.59
The constitutional basis for granting citizenship subject to a
condition subsequent is not readily apparent, and at least one
commentator has suggested that "history is non-committal" about
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. Id. art. I, § 8, cL 4.
53. The first Naturalization Act, that of March 26, 1790, provided that "the chil-
dren of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond the sea, or out of
the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural-born citizens." Act
of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
54. Ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797 (subsequently amended).
55. Id. § 1.
56. 3 C. GORDON & IL ROSENMIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 13.3c,
at 13-15 (rev. ed. 1978); see Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961).
57. See HR. REP. No. 131, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); S. REP. No. 865, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1933).
58. Ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797 (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976)). The
Act provided that the right of citizenship "shall not descend" unless the child sat-
isfied these conditions, but the Attorney General construed the grant of citizen-
ship to vest at birth, subject to defeasance if the child did. not meet the conditions.
38 Op. ATTY GEN. 10 (1934).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976).
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congressional power to expatriate citizens. 60 The Supreme Court,
however, has held that Congress does have the power to grant
conditional citizenship. A short review of three recent major deci-
sions is instructive to show the considerations the Court has
deemed important.
In Schneider v. RuskSl the Court held unconstitutional a provi-
sion of the Immigration and Nationality Act that withdrew citizen-
ship for any naturalized citizen who resided in the State of his
former nationality or of his birth for three consecutive years.62
The Government argued first that the provision was a reasonable
exercise of congressional power over foreign relations because
naturalized citizens often retain citizenship in their native States
and because serious conflict with foreign States could arise if the
United States tried to protect those citizens abroad. Second, the
Government argued that three years' residence in the naturalized
citizen's native land tends to attenuate his allegiance to the
United States. The Government argued that distinguishing be-
tween native-born and naturalized citizens as classes, without re-
gard to individual circumstances, is not invidious. Rather, the
Government argued that expatriation is a reasonable alternative
to withdrawing diplomatic protection from such citizens.63
The Court disagreed, "start[ing] from the premise that the
rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized per-
son are of the same dignity and are coextensive."64 Congressional
power to limit the activities of naturalized citizens, the Court
held, is not unlimited. A limitation on the activities of naturalized
citizens is constitutional only if the means, withdrawal of citizen-
ship, is reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within con-
gressional power. avoiding embarrassment in foreign relations. 65
The Court held that discriminating against naturalized citizens by
so severely limiting their right to live abroad created a second-
class citizenship. "Living abroad," the Court concluded, "whether
the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no badge of lack of al-
60. Comment, Expatriation Law in the United States: The Confusing Legacy
of Afroyim and BelleL, 13 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 406, 420 (1974).
61. 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
62. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L No. 82-414, § 352, 66 Stat.
163.
63. 377 U.S. at 165.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 166 (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 60 (1958)).
legiance ...."66
Three years after Schneider, the Supreme Court decided
Afroyim v. Rusk.67 The issue in Afroyim was whether Congress
could expatriate a citizen for voting in a foreign election. Mr. Jus-
tice Black, writing for a five-member majority, rejected the theory
that Congress has any general power to expatriate a citizen with-
out his consent.68 The Court rejected the Schneider test in favor
of an absolute bar to involuntary expatriation. To follow the logic
of Schneider and its predecessors that Congress may expatriate a
citizen whose activities may impede the conduct of United States
foreign policy, Justice Black argued, would be to allow Congress
to "abridge," "affect," "restrict the effect of," and "take ... away"
citizenship in contravention of the fourteenth amendment.69
Afroyim is the broadest interpretation of the nature of citizen-
ship and the greatest restriction on congressional power to
abridge the right. The logic of Afroyim suggests that Congress is
powerless to take away citizenship absent a citizen's unambigu-
ous action showing an intent to expatriate himself. The result in
Schneider, that mere absence from the United States was insuffi-
cient to show an intent to expatriate oneself, together with the
reasoning of Afroyim, suggest that section 301(b) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act is unconstitutional because it deprives
the children of one United States citizen and one alien of their cit-
izenship if they do not come to the United States for two years.
The plaintiff in Rogers v. Bellei,70 which the Supreme Court de-
cided four years after Afroyim, and the three-judge court that ini-
66. Id. at 169. In Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), in which the Court first
formulated the due process test it applied in Schneider, the issue before the Court
was congressional power to expatriate a citizen for voting in a foreign election.
The Court held that such expatriation did not violate due process. The distinction
between Perez and Schneider thus seems to be the nature of the expatriating act:
Congress may expatriate a citizen for committing a voluntary political act that af-
firmatively shows allegiance to a foreign State, but it cannot expatriate a citizen
for committing passive, apolitical acts, without more. The Court, however, over-
ruled Perez in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), and upheld expatriation for
continued residence abroad in Rogers v. Belei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), so the sug-
gested distinction is not supported by current law. Commentators, however, have
criticized Bellei severely, so the distinction may regain some validity if the
Supreme Court overrules Bellei. See, e.g., Schwartz, American Citizenship After
Afroyim and Bellei: Continuing Controversy, 2 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 1003, 1020-27
(1975); Comment, Expatriation Law in the United States: The Confusing Legacy
of Afroyim and Bellei, 13 Corimr. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 406 (1974); Casenote, Problems
of the Foreign-Born Citizen, 11 COLUm. J. TRANSNAT'L L 304 (1972).
67. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
68. Id. at 257.
69. Id. at 267.
70. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
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tially heard Bellei7 ' both relied heavily on Afroyim and
Schneider. The trial court used the logic suggested in the preced-
ing paragraph to hold section 301(b) unconstitutional, but the
Supreme Court reversed. Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, implicitly reverted to the ends-means due process test of
Schneider and earlier decisions when he noted that "Congress
has an appropriate concern with problems attendant on dual na-
tionality"72 and that "the [statutory] solution to the dual national-
ity dilemma ... surely is not unreasonable. It may not be the
best that could be devised, but ... we cannot say that it is irra-
tional or arbitrary or unfair."73 In holding section 301(b) constitu-
tional, the Court interpreted the citizenship clause of the
fourteenth amendment, granting citizenship to "all persons born
or naturalized in the United States,"74 quite narrowly:
The central fact, in our weighing of the plaintiffs claim to continuing
and therefore current United States citizenship, is that he was born
abroad. He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in
the United States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sen-
tence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff BelleL.
He simply is not a Fourteenth-Amendment-first-sentence citizen.75
In addition to citing congressional concern with problems of
dual nationality, the Court cited Congress's history of "careful
consideration" of the statutory scheme. The Court also noted that
"(a] contrary holding would convert what is congressional gener-
osity into something unanticipated and obviously undesired by
Congress" 76 to support its conclusion that section 301(b) was con-
stitutional. Two arguments were particularly important to the
Court. First, the Court felt that "it does not make good constitu-
tional sense, or comport with logic, to say, on the one hand, that
Congress may impose a condition precedent, with no constitu-
tional complication, and yet be powerless to impose precisely the
same condition subsequent."77 Second, the Court recognized the
plaintiff's lack of attachment to the United States and that he did
71. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd sub nom. Rogers v.
Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
72. 401 U.S. at 831.
73. Id. at 833.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
75. 401 U.S. at 827. The trial court characterized as "niggardly" the Govern-
ment's interpretation of § 301(b), which the Supreme Court adopted. 296 F. Supp.
at 1249.
76. 401 U.S. at 833, 835.
77. Id. at 834.
not become stateless but retained his Italian citizenship.78 The
concluding sentence of the Court's opinion was thus narrow: "We
hold that § 301(b) has no constitutional infirmity in its applica-
tion to plaintiff Bellei."79
Although Bellei appears to settle the constitutionality of section
301(b), three theories might support another challenge to the stat-
ute by an Amerasian who has not or cannot satisfy the residency
requirement.80 The first theory derives from Bellei's return to
the fifth amendment due process test of Schneider v. Rusk. In
Schneider, the Court noted that although the fifth amendment
contains no equal protection clause, its due process clause pre-
vents the most unjustifiable kinds of discrimination.8 ' Among the
classifications that the Court has held to require the most strin-
gent judicial scrutiny are those discriminating on the basis of a
person's status at birth. Two series of decisions in the past de-
cade show the Court's reluctance to accept any discrimination
based on either legitimacy 82 or alienage.83 Just as a person can-
not choose to be born legitimate or to be born a citizen, so a per-
son cannot choose whether to be born a member of the "discrete
and insular"84 group of citizens to which section 301(b) applies.
Thus, a new and intensive judicial review of section 301(b) may
be appropriate.
However, all of the Court's illegitimacy decisions and all but
two of its alienage decisions have concerned challenges to state,
rather than to federal, regulations that discriminated on the basis
78. Id. at 836.
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. The Amerasian children whom ISS studied are not the only potential chal-
lengers of § 301(b). ISS reported that from 1962 to 1971, 327,460 children were born
of one United States citizen and one alien parent. Twenty-five percent of these
children were affected by the residency requirement, and 1,243 persons actually
lost their United States citizenship because of § 301(b) during the period. ISS
STUrY, supra note 2, at 42.
81. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (quoting Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954)).
82. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights
Org'n v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971);
Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968).
83. See Foley v. Connelie, 434 U.S. 866 (1978); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1
(1977); Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects, and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero,
426 U.S. 752 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973).
84. "Aliens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority
... for whom... heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate." Graham v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
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of status at birth. The Court has been far more willing to uphold
federal regulations because of Congress's powers to regulate im-
migration and to control foreign affairs.8 5 Thus, in Mathews v.
Diaz,8 6 the Court upheld the portion of the Social Security Act87
restricting eligibility of resident aliens for Medicare to those who
had lived in the United States for at least five years. And in
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,8 8 the Court recognized that Con-
gress and the President could exclude aliens from the federal civil
service, though the Court held that due process required the deci-
sion to exclude aliens to be made at a level of authority compara-
ble to that which makes immigration policy.8 9 Thus, the Court's
inhospitality to discrimination against aliens does not extend to
federal regulations intimately bound up with foreign policy. The
same exception probably would extend to section 301(b) because
of the foreign policy implications of dual nationality.
A second, more promising theory that might support a new
challenge to section 301(b) is the weakness of the Bellei Court's
narrow interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's extension of
citizenship to persons "naturalized in the United States." Justice
Blackmun attached a purely geographical meaning to this phrase
to hold that Bellei had statutory rather than constitutional citi-
zenship. Justice Black, in dissent, argued strongly that the
phrase carried no such geographic limitations, but that it included
any acquisition of citizenship other than by birth within the
United States.90 Although this interpretation commanded only
three votes in Bellei, it has considerable support in prior deci-
sions of the Court9 ' and in the history of the adoption of the four-
85. "[A] division by a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of
that State into subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no apparent
justification, whereas, a comparable classification by the Federal Government is a
routine and normally legitimate part of its business." Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,
85 (1976).
86. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1395o (2) (A) (ii) (1976).
88. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
89. Id. at 116. Subsequently, President Ford limited the civil service to citi-
zens and nationals of the United States. Exec. Order No. 11,935, 3 C.F.R. § 146
(1977). For a discussion of Mow Sun Wong, see Comment, Federal Civil Service
Employment: Aliens Need Not Apply, 15 SAN DIEGO L REV. 171 (1977). The Sev-
enth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of Exec. Order No. 11,935, supra, in
Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978). See 47 U.S.L.W. 2161 (1978).
90. 401 U.S. at 840 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898), the Court held
that
teenth amendment. 92 Used in conjunction with the due process
arguments discussed above, it may overcome the decision in
Bellei.
The third and most persuasive theory for not applying section
301(b) to stateless persons comes from the Court's opinion in
Bellei. One of the Court's major concerns there was dual nation-
ality. The Court noted that Bellei retained his Italian citizenship
and carefully limited its holding to the facts presented. Certainly,
the congressional concern with dual nationality that the Court
noted is irrelevant if the plaintiff has no second nationality. The
Court's reasoning was similar to the due process test of
Schneider, which requires at least some congruence between
ends sought and means adopted. Applying section 301(b) to dual
nationals may reduce friction between the United States and the
dual nationals' native countries; applying it to otherwise stateless
people' cannot reduce tension, but can only exacerbate it as other
nations are forced to accept those whom the United States ren-
ders stateless.
Congressional concern with the friction that dual nationality
may cause led to the enactment of section 301(b), but the statute
lessens international tension at a cost of significant individual
hardship. Amendments to section 301(b) could reduce or elimi-
nate the hardships that now exist without creating additional ten-
sion between two States claiming a dual national's allegiance.
These amendments and other possible legal changes that would
reduce statelessness arising from the conflict of nationality laws
will be considered after further discussion of the consequences of
statelessness.
The Fourteenth Amendment ... contemplates two sources of citizen-
ship, and only two: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization
can only be acquired ... under the authority and in the forms of law, But
citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the cir-
cumstances defined in the Constitution.... A person born out of the ju-
risdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being
naturalized ....
92. The original language of the fourteenth amendment granted citizenship to
all people born in the United States or "naturalized by the laws thereof." It has
been argued that the language adopted was meant to have equal effect. H. FLACK,
THE ADopTIoN OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDmENT 83-89 (1908). See Casenote,
Problems of the Foreign-Born Citizen, 11 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 304, 312 (1972).
Commentators have criticized the result and the logic of Bellei extensively,
lending further support to the plausibility of a successful attack on it. E.g., J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBoOK ON CONSTrTnoNAL LAw 901-02 (1978); L.
TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 279-80 (1978); Hertz, Limits to the Naturali-
zation Power, 64 GEO. LJ. 1007, 1027-29 (1976); Wasserman, The Involuntary Expa-
triation of Statutory Americans, 5 INT'L LAw. 413 (1971); Comment, Expatriation
Law in the United States: The Confusing Legacy of Afroyirn and Bellei, 13 COLUm.
J. TRANsNAT'L L. 406 (1974); Casenote, Problems of the Foreign-Born Citizen, 11
COLum J. TRANSNAT'L L. 304 (1972).
[VoL 16: 35, 19781 Conflict of Nationality Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
THE CONSEQUENCES OF STATELESSNESS
The consequences under municipal law if an individual allows
his United States citizenship to lapse are immediate and substan-
tial: Under Japanese law, an alien may lack capacity to perform
legal acts, and aliens and stateless people are ineligible for many
social welfare programs.9 3 Under United States law, aliens may
be ineligible for employment in the federal civil service. Congress
is free to impose other restrictions on aliens. Amerasians may be
unable to transmit the right to United States citizenship to their
children even before their citizenship lapses 9 4 The consequences
of statelessness under international law, while not as immediate,
may be far more serious to the Amerasian children that ISS stud-
ied.
The most important consequence of statelessness under inter-
national law is "[n]ot the loss of any specific rights . . . , but the
loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights
whatsoever."95 Those children of mixed marriages who remain in
Japan will do so at the sufferance of the Japanese government.
Though expulsion or other harsh treatment seems unlikely now,
it is not implausible that severe economic or political problems
could lead to discrimination against or expulsion of aliens. In
such a situation no State would be obliged to accept stateless
Amerasians, and no State would be competent to protect them if
they remained in Japan.96
The seeming harshness of this prospect may be mitigated by
the recognition that international law grants basic human
rights-life, liberty, and freedom of conscience-without benefit of
protection by a State.9 7 However, "basic human rights" are very
limited. Lauterpacht, for example, maintains that "it cannot be
considered maltreatment if a State compels individuals destitute
of nationality either to become naturalized or to leave the coun-
try."98 Further, no State may be competent to assert rights of
93. See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
94. See note 49 and text accompanying notes 85-89 supra.
95. H. ARENwT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTmxaTARJmsM 297 (1966).
96. One authority suggests, however, that for a State to expel stateless per-
sons infringes the sovereignty of the receiving State. A. MTRucA, supra note 2,
at 174.
97. Id. at 15.
98. 1 L. OPPENREi, supra note 4, § 312, at 668 n.4.
stateless persons absent gross violations of human rights.99
Although the consequences of statelessness occurring under
municipal law may be more immediate, the consequences under
international law are potentially far more devastating. Japan
need not, under international law, accord stateless persons equal
or even fair protection under its laws. Japan may expel them at
will, and because they are citizens of no other State, no other
State is obligated to accept them. The ultimate appeal of a state-
less person cannot be to a legal system, for he has none to protect
him. It must be to a moral system, to the humanity of the State in
which he finds himself.100
SOLUTIONS TO THE DILEnA
Reducing the amount of statelessness that occurs as the result
of the conflict of nationality laws may be accomplished at several
levels. At a minimum, States may act unilaterally to facilitate
naturalization of individuals. States also may act unilaterally to
reduce the number of instances of statelessness that their own
nationality laws cause. They may act bilaterally to eliminate the
statelessness caused by specific conflicts in nationality laws. Ulti-
mately, they could eliminate all statelessness caused by the con-
flict of nationality laws through multilateral agreements creating
a single system of nationality law.
Because most of the children of the ISS study are culturally
Japanese, the least disruptive solution to their nationality
problems is to become naturalized Japanese citizens. The Japa-
nese Nationality Law has more lenient requirements for naturali-
zation of children of Japanese citizens than for others. A child
must have been born in Japan, have lived in Japan for three
years, and be "of upright conduct."1 0 l Most other applicants must
have five years' consecutive residence and independent means of
99. A. MUTHARIKA, .supra note 2, at 15. Lauterpacht, in 1 L OPPENHEi, supra
note 4, § 292, at 640-41, suggests that a State is entitled to treat its nationals and
stateless persons within its territory at its discretion. A "right of intervention" to
protect human rights may exist, but Lauterpacht argues that States are most re-
luctant to assert it unless human rights are "ruthlessly trampled upon." France,
Great Britain, and Russia intervened in the Greco-Turkish War in 1824 to stop
atrocities being committed against Turkish Christians. Id. § 137. The Charter of
the United Nations contains rudimentary guarantees of a collective right of inter-
vention. U.N. CHA=RTR art. 2, para. 7. See 1 L. OPPENHEi, mupra §§ 137, 168f.
100. Lauterpacht suggests that States have an obligation under the general
principles of the United Nations Charter to respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms, but that beyond such treaty obligations and "restraints laid down by
morality," they may maltreat stateless individuals to any extent. 1 L. OPPENHEM,
supra note 4, § 291, at 640.
101. Nationality Law, supra note 2, art. 4, § 3; art. 5, § 3; art. 6, § 5.
[voL 16: 35, 19781 Conflict of Nationality Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
support.102 Although the Amerasian children that ISS studied are
eligible for naturalization, the Japanese Minister of Justice has
discretion with respect to each application,1O3 so no child has a
right to be naturalized.
Case-by-case naturalization will treat only the symptoms of
Amerasian children's statelessness, not the causes. Several uni-
lateral means of preventing future instances of statelessness are
available to both the United States and Japan. The Japanese
could amend their Nationality Law to grant citizenship to children
who have only one Japanese parent, and either nation could
amend its nationality laws to allow parents of different nationali-
ties to choose one or the other for each of their children. 0 4 Such
amendments would represent major departures from the Japa-
nese law of jus sanguinis, however, and could disrupt the statu-
tory scheme severely.
In comparison, section 301(b) has a history of amendment and
is a relatively minor feature of United States nationality law. Ei-
ther of two amendments would resolve many of the problems of
both Bellei and the conflict of nationality laws. First, Congress
could revise section 301(b) to grant citizenship to children born
abroad of a United States parent and an alien only after they re-
side in the United States for two years between the ages of four-
teen and twenty-eight, thus replacing the existing condition
subsequent with a condition precedent.l0 5 Justice Blackmun in
Bellei noted that such a requirement would present "no Constitu-
tional complication" and held that the condition subsequent also
presented no constitutional problem. 06 None of the doubt about
the validity of involuntary expatriation that Bellei has spawned
would arise by substituting a condition precedent. Further, Con-
gress could grant preferential treatment to those children of one
United States citizen parent who elect to become United States
citizens, similar to the preferential treatment it now grants to
102. Id. art. 4, §§ 1, 4.
103. Id. art. 3, § 2; art 6.
104. The Korean Democratic People's Republic, for example, allows a North
Korean living abroad and his or her spouse to agree on the nationality of their
children who are born abroad. See Nationality Law of October 9,1963, art. 5, trans-
lated in Kim, North Korean Nationality Law, 6 INv'L LAW. 324, 325 (1972).
105. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
106. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 834 (1971). See text accompanying note 77
supra.
alien wives of citizens. 0 7
Second, Congress could amend section 301(b) to naturalize only
those children of one United States citizen and one alien who do
not acquire a second nationality by descent from the alien parent
or from jus soli in the State in which born. Congress's concern
historically has been with the conflicting loyalties and interna-
tional friction that dual nationality might cause. Absent dual na-
tionality, loyalties cannot conflict, and granting United States
nationality only when statelessness otherwise would result does
not conflict with the congressional purpose of reducing potential
sources of international friction.
Although amendment of the nationality laws of Japan and the
United States could eliminate the cause of the potential stateless-
ness of Amerasian children, politics may make such a possibility
unlikely. The two governments could achieve many of the same
results by treaty or by executive agreement. While such agree-
ments might not change the legal status of the children, they
could mitigate the effects of statelessness by according the chil-
dren some of the more important social and economic benefits of
citizenship. The United States has concluded similar treaties
dealing with other conflicts between nationality laws, such as the
agreement with France10 8 following World War H in which each
nation accepted service by dual nationals in the other's armed
forces as satisfaction of its own wartime military obligation. In
the case of Japanese-American conflict of nationality laws, each
nation could extend to those citizens of the other who have one
parent from each nation the same rights to social services as its
own citizens enjoy. If appropriate, the United States could accom-
pany such an agreement with aid to offset the additional costs
that Japan might incur.
Naturalization and unilateral and bilateral action can have only
limited success at eliminating statelessness that results from the
conflict of nationality laws. So long as jus sanguinis and jus soli
coexist, bilateral and unilateral actions can resolve only specific
conflicts, not the underlying cause. The most radical, but thor-
ough, solution proposed to eliminate the conflict of nationality
laws is the adoption of a single, universal system. Lauterpacht, in
his edition of Oppenheim's International Law, proposes that ev-
eryone be entitled to the nationality of the State of his birth un-
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1430 (1976).
108. Military Obligations of Certain Persons Having Dual Nationality, Feb. 25,
1948, United States-France, 62 Stat. 1950, T.LA.S. No. 1756. Reciprocal acceptance
of military service by dual nationals was extended to include service in World War
I in a similar agreement. Military Obligations of Certain Persons Having Dual Na-
tionality, Dec. 22, 1948, United States-France, 62 Stat. 3621, T.LA.S. No. 1876.
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less on attaining majority he chooses his parents' nationality.109
As a corollary, Lauterpacht advocates eliminating all expatria-
tion, whether voluntary or involuntary, unless the person simulta-
neously acquires a new nationality. This proposal, presumably to
be implemented by either multilateral treaty or municipal statute,
realistically reflects the needs of most people who have either two
nationalities or none as the result of conflict of nationality laws.
Those persons born outside their parents' native State who return
early in their childhood might legally be aliens in their homeland
until they reach majority, but allowing parents a choice between
the States of birth and of home for the child's nationality could
eliminate such hardships. A uniform system of nationality laws
such as Lauterpacht advocates would eliminate statelessness re-
sulting from the conflict of nationality laws. However, because
States guard their power to define the prerequisites for citizen-
ship so carefully and because citizenship is so often a divisive po-
litical issue, uniformity must remain an ideal rather than a
realistic goal.
CONCLUSION
Increased mobility in the twentieth century has made possible
more international marriages than ever before. Among the at-
tendant political and legal problems has been the inevitable state-
lessness or dual nationality of children born outside their parents'
native States. The conflict between systems based on jus soli and
jus sanguinis produces instances of statelessness. The 4,000 chil-
dren of the ISS study illustrate the problem well: They are the
victims of their inheritance, powerless to eliminate the source of
their statelessness.
Elimination of the statelessness that results from the conflict of
nationality laws nonetheless is possible. Naturalization and uni-
lateral modification of nationality laws will eliminate individual
cases and causes of statelessness. Bilateral treaties may elimi-
109. 1 L. OPPENHEn, supra note 4, § 313a, at 674. During the twentieth century,
many efforts have been made to reduce statelessness and its effects, but most
have been limited to specific groups of stateless persons, primarily refugees. See
the discussion in P. WEis, supra note 1, at 161. Additionally, efforts have been
made to reduce the statelessness resulting from the conflict of nationality laws by
encouraging States to adopt uniform nationality laws and to enter into interna-
tional agreements to reduce statelessness. See Mutharika, International Law and
Loss of Nationality, 3 E. AFR. L. REV. 205, 214 (1970).
nate some effects. However, so long as the international order ac-
cepts two inconsistent systems of nationality laws, some
statelessness is inevitable. Only multilateral agreement on a
common system of nationality law can prevent future legal, eco-
nomic, and social disabilities such as the children of the ISS
study suffer.
ADDENDUM
After this article had gone to press, Congress repealed section
301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which contained
the two-year residency requirement for those children born
abroad of one United States citizen and one alien.110 Henceforth,
children born under such circumstances will have indefeasible
United States citizenship provided that the citizen parent had
been physically present in the United States for ten years, at least
five of which were after the age of fourteen."' The legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress intended the repeal to operate only
prospectively,11 2 so those people who have already lost their citi-
zenship as the result of the operation of section 301(b) will not
regain it by virtue of the repeal.1 3 Congress eliminated the resi-
dency requirement because of the inequity of subjecting only one
narrow class of citizens to any residency requirement and be-
cause "[I]oss of citizenship has been likened to banishment and
exile. Citizenship should not be conferred lightly, but once it is
conferred, it should not be lightly, nor discriminatorily re-
voked."1 4 The Departments of State and Justice both supported
the repeal of section 301(b).115
Most of the children in the ISS study do not now face the pros-
110. Act of Oct. 10, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 92 Stat. 1046.
111. Section 301(a) (7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
401(a)(7) (1976) (now renumbered § 301(g), 8 U.S.C. § 401(g)), which requires 10
years' physical presence in the United States before the parent may transmit citi-
zenship to his or her offspring, remains in effect.
112. The committee report states that "the intent of the bill... is to repeal [§]
301(b) ... in a prospective manner. Thus, those citizens who have lost their citi-
zenship ... before the date of enactment of this bill will not be restored to citizen-
ship." H.R. REP. No. 1493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
113. The committee reported that between 1972 and 1977, 693 people had lost
their citizenship pursuant to § 301(b). Id. The committee did not state how many
of these people had retained a second nationality and how many people had be-
come stateless.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Letter from Patricia M. Wald, Assistant Attorney General, to the Hon. Pe-
ter W. Rodino, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives (Dec. 12, 1977), reprinted in id. at 6; Letter from Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to the Hon. Peter W.
Rodino, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives
(Dec. 9, 1977), reprinted in id. at 5.
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pect of statelessness, 116 and the consequences of statelessness
need no longer concern them. The repeal of section 301(b), how-
ever, does not improve the legal or economic circumstances of the
majority of the children, who were raised as Japanese and who
have neither the desire nor the means to come to the United
States. Because those children can no longer become stateless,
the Horei's substitution of domicile for nationality as the determi-
nant of capacity for stateless persons can never be invoked, and
should the question of the capacity of one of these persons to per-
form a legal act ever come before a Japanese court, the court will
have to decide whether to invoke the public policy exception of
the Horei by analogy to the Japanese-Filipino divorce deci-
sions.117 Further, because the boys among the children that ISS
studied will not now become stateless, Japanese law will deny all
of their children Japanese citizenship, not merely those born
before the boys reach age twenty-eight.1 1 8 United States law still
requires presence in the United States for a substantial period
before citizens born abroad can transmit citizenship to their is-
sue," 9 so all the children of the boys in the ISS study who remain
in Japan to raise their families will be stateless from birth. Al-
though the "first generation" statelessness that section 301(b)
caused has been eliminated, the "second-generation" stateless-
ness that results will be more widespread because of its repeal.
Of course, the repeal of section 301(b) did not affect the status of
the children in the ISS study as aliens in Japan. They remain in-
eligible for many social welfare programs because they are not
Japanese citizens, and the change in the legal relationship with a
116. Because the repeal operates prospectively, those children who were under
age 26 at the time of repeal will not lose their citizenship, and those who were over
28 will not regain theirs. The status of those between 26 and 28 years old is some-
what unclear. Although they could not have retained their citizenship under §
301(b), they had not yet lost it formally. Because the declared intent of the repeal
was to eliminate hardship, and because the committee report was cast in terms of
not restoring citizenship already lost, a court faced with a challenge to the contin-
uing citizenship of one of the 26- to 28-year-olds should be most reluctant to hold
him to have forfeited it.
117. See notes 36-40 and accompanying text supra.
118. See the hypothetical situation discussed in notes 49-50 and accompanying
text supra.
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (7) (1976) (now renumbered § 1401(g)) requires that a
citizen have been present in the United States for at least 10 years, at least five of
which were after his or her fourteenth birthday, before his or her children born
abroad of a mixed marriage acquire United States citizenship when they are born.
State many of them will never visit does not ameliorate the eco-
nomic instability of many of their families.
Thus, although Congress intended to reduce hardship by re-
pealing section 301(b), the ironic result is that the Amerasian
children in Japan whom it affected may suffer additional legal dis-
advantages unless they emigrate to the United States. This unin-
tended consequence highlights the ultimate need for a uniform
system of nationality laws and the immediate need for flexibility
in intermediate amendments to existing nationality laws. Implicit
in the congressional concern for the hardships that section 301(b)
created was an assumption that all who were affected suffered
identical consequences. Those who, like Aldo Bellei, want to re-
tain their United States citizenship, will welcome the repeal, but
those for whom United States citizenship creates legal or eco-
nomic hardship in the States where they reside will suffer addi-
tional or at least prolonged hardships.
Congress recently established the Select Commission on Immi-
gration and Refugee Policy, 12o one of whose tasks is to "conduct a
study and analysis of the effects of the provisions of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (and administrative interpretations
thereof) on ... the conduct of foreign policy."121 Two significant
ways for the Commission to carry out this mandate would be to
investigate means of international consultation on the effects of
amendments to immigration and nationality laws and to recom-
mend Congress investigate the impact of proposed amendments
to the Immigration and Nationality Act before approving them.
So long as jus soli and .jus sanguinis coexist, some people will be
denied nationality and others will have dual nationality. A first
step toward reducing the number of people thus affected and the
hardships they suffer will be for States to consider the effects of
their nationality laws beyond their own borders. The well-inten-
tioned repeal of section 301(b) illustrates the disparity between
intended and actual consequences that results from a parochial
approach to the effects of States' nationality laws.
120. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat. 907 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1151 note).
121. Id. § 4(d)(1)(D).
